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a b s t r a c t
We study the automated verification of pointer safety for heap-
manipulating imperative programs with unknown procedure
calls. Given a Hoare-style partial correctness specification S =
{Pre}C{Post} in separation logic, where the program C contains
calls to some unknown procedure U , we infer a specification
SU for the unknown procedure U from the calling contexts. We
show that the problem of verifying the program C against the
specification S can be safely reduced to the problem of proving
that the procedure U (once its code is available) meets the derived
specification SU . The expected specification SU for the unknown
procedure U is automatically calculated using an abduction-based
shape analysis. We have also implemented a prototype system to
validate the viability of our approach. Preliminary results show that
the specifications derived by our tool fully capture the behaviors of
the unknown code in many cases.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
While automated verification of memory safety remains a big challenge (Jones et al., 2006;
Woodcock, 2006), especially for substantial system software such as the Linux distribution and device
drivers, significant advances have been seen recently on the automated verification of pointer safety
for such software (Calcagno et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2008). The abduction-based compositional shape
analysis (Calcagno et al., 2009) is able to calculate the pre/post-specifications for procedures in a
bottom-up approach, based on the call-dependency graph. It can verify the pointer safety of a large
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portion of the Linux kernel andmanydevice driversmanipulating sharedmutable data structures. One
issue that has not been dealtwith in theirwork is unknownprocedure calls. In their SpaceInvader tool,
unknown calls are currently ignored and replaced by the empty statement skip during the verification.
This may lead to imprecise or unsound results in general. Our aim here is to investigate this issue
carefully and provide a better solution to the verification of pointer safety of programs with unknown
calls.
Automated program verifiers usually require to have access to the entire given program, which
in practice may not be completely available for various reasons. For instance, some programs (e.g. in
C) may contain unknown calls that correspond to function pointers, some programs (e.g. in OO) may
contain calls to interface methods whose actual implementations may not be available statically, and
some programs may have calls to library procedures whose code is not available during verification.
Other possible scenarios can be found in remote procedure calls such as COM/DCOM (Sessions, 1998),
mobile code and software upgrading, where program fragments may be unavailable at verification
time. To deal with the verification of programs with unknown procedure calls, current automated
program verifiers:
• ignore the unknown procedure calls, e.g. replacing them by skip (Calcagno et al., 2009), which can
be unsound in general; or
• assume that the program and the unknown procedure have disjoint memory footprints so that
the unknown call can be safely ignored due to the hypothetical frame rule (O’Hearn et al., 2004)—
however, this assumption does not hold in many cases; or
• use specificationmining (Ammons et al., 2002) to discover possible specifications for the (unknown
part of the) program, which is performed dynamically by observing the execution traces and is not
likely to be exhaustive for all possible program behaviors; or
• take into account all possible implementations for the unknown procedure (Emami et al., 1994;
Gopan and Reps, 2007)—in general, there can be toomany such candidates, making the verification
almost impossible at compile time; or
• simply stop at the first unknown procedure call and provide an incomplete verification, which is
obviously undesirable.
Approach and contributions. We propose a different approach in this paper to the verification of
programs with unknown procedure calls. Given a specification S = {Pre} C {Post} for the program C
containing calls to an unknown procedure U, our solution is to proceed with the verification for the
known fragments of C, and at the same time infer a specification SU that is expected for the unknown
procedure U based on the calling context(s). The problem of verifying the program C against the
specification S can now be safely reduced to the problem of verifying the procedure U against the
inferred specification SU, provided that the verification of the known fragments does not cause any
problems. The inferred specification is subject to a later verification when an implementation or a
specification for the unknown procedure becomes available (e.g. at loading time in Java).
The intuition of our method to infer the unknown procedure’s specification can be divided into
two steps. The first step is to analyze the code before the unknown procedure call to discover its
precondition. The second is to analyze the code after the unknown call in order to discover its
postcondition. For the second step, one might suggest using a deductive backwards analysis, starting
from the postcondition of the program being verified, to derive an expected postcondition for the
unknown procedure. We cannot follow this suggestion due to a technical challenge: backwards
reasoning over the separation domain is simply too costly to implement (Calcagno et al., 2009).
Therefore, we exploit an abductive forwards reasoning (Calcagno et al., 2009; Giacobazzi, 1994) to
derive the unknown procedure’s postcondition, and in this way the verification can be accomplished.
Our paper makes the following technical contributions:
• We propose a novel framework in separation logic for the verification of pointer safety for
programs with unknown calls.
• The top-down feature of our approach can potentially benefit the general software development
process. Given the specification for the caller procedure, it can be used to infer the specification
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for the callee procedures. This is a potentially beneficial complement for current bottom-up
approaches (Gulavani et al., 2009).
• We have enhanced the abduction mechanism, resulting in an improved algorithm for verification
use. Compared with bi-abductive analysis of Calcagno et al. (2009) ours has added additional
reasoning rules (e.g. for the list tail matching) such that the use of inaccurate reasoning rules (like
the ‘‘missing’’ rule) is avoided inmany cases.Wehave also introduced amore practical partial order
in order to judge the quality of different solutions for abduction.
• We have successfully incorporated the call-by-reference mechanism into the forward analyses in
the separation domain.
• We have built a prototype system to test the viability and performance of our approach, and we
have conducted some initial experimental studies to evaluate the precision of the results and the
scalability of our system. Preliminary results show that our tool canderive expressive specifications
which fully capture the behaviors of the unknown code in many cases.
Outline. Section 2 employs amotivating example to informally illustrate ourmain approach. Section 3
presents the programming language and the abstract domain for our analysis. Section 4 introduces
our abductive reasoning. Section 5 defines two abstract semantics used in our verification. Section 6
depicts our verification algorithms. Experimental results are shown in Section 7, followed by some
concluding remarks.
2. A motivating example
In this section we illustrate informally, via an example, how our analysis infers the specification
for an unknown procedure. Our analysis makes use of a separation domain similar to the one used in
the SpaceInvader tool (Calcagno et al., 2009; Distefano et al., 2006). To keep the presentation simple,
we use a small imperative language with both call-by-value and call-by-reference parameters for
procedures. Formal details about the abstract domain and the language will be given in Section 3.
Example 1. Our goal is to verify the procedure findLast against the given pre/post-specifications
shown in Fig. 1. The data structure node { int data; node next } defines a node in a linked list.
The predicate ls(x, y) used in the pre/post-specifications as well as other places denotes a (possibly
empty) list segment referred to by x and ended with the pointer y (i.e., y denotes the next field of the
last node). Its formal definition is given later.
According to the given specification, the procedure findLast takes in a non-empty linked list x
and stores a reference to the last node of the list in the call-by-reference parameter z. Here we group
call-by-value and call-by-reference parameters together and use a semicolon ; to separate them. Note
that findLast calls an unknown procedure unkProc at line 4. 
For this example, the unknown call to unkProc performs essential modification to a local
variable, so it can neither be regarded as skip nor dealt with using the hypothetical frame rule. The
candidate implementations ofunkProc are not available, preventing a verification against all possible
candidates. However our approach is still applicable here as described below.
We conduct a symbolic execution (Berdine et al., 2005; Nguyen et al., 2007) on the procedure body
startingwith the precondition PrefindLast (line 0a). The results of our analysis (e.g. the abstract states)
aremarked as comments in the code. The analysis carries on as a standard forward shape analysis until
the unknown procedure call at line 4 is reached.
At line 3, the current symbolic heap ∆ is split into two disjoint parts: the local part H (line 3b)
that is dependent on, and possibly mutated by, the unknown procedure; and the frame part R0 (line
3c) that is not accessed by the unknown procedure. Intuitively, the local part of a symbolic heap w.r.t.
a set of variables X is the part of the heap reachable from variables in X (together with the aliasing
information); while the frame part denotes the unreachable heap part (together with the aliasing
information). For example, for a symbolic heap ls(x, w) ∗ ls(y, z) ∗ ls(z, null) ∧ w=z, its local part
w.r.t. {x} is ls(x, w) ∗ ls(z, null) ∧ w=z, and its frame part w.r.t. {x} is ls(y, z) ∧ w=z. We will give
their formal definitions in Section 6.
1166 C. Luo et al. / Journal of Symbolic Computation 45 (2010) 1163–1183
// Given Specification:
// PrefindLast := ls(x, null) ∧ x6=null
// PostfindLast := ls(x, z) ∗ z 7→null
void findLast(node x; ref node z) {
0 node w, y;
0a // ∆ := PrefindLast ∆ ` x6=null
1 w := x.next;
1a // ∆ := x7→w ∗ ls(w, null) ∧ x6=null
2 if (w == null) z := x;
2a // ∆ := x7→w ∧ x6=null ∧ w=null ∧ z=x
2b // ∃w, y ·∆ ` PostfindLast
3 else {
3a // ∆ := x7→w ∗ ls(w, null) ∧ x6=null ∧ w 6=null
3b // H := Local(∆, {x, y}) := x7→w ∗ ls(w, null) ∧ x6=null ∧ w 6=null
3c // R0 := Frame(∆, {x, y}) := emp ∧ x6=null ∧ w 6=null
4 unkProc(x; y);
4a // ∆ := R0 ∗M0 M0 := (emp ∧ x=a ∧ y=b) M := M0
4b // ∆ 0 [y/x] PrefindLast
4c // ∆ ∗ [M1] F [y/x] PrefindLast (s.t.∆ ∗M1 ` [y/x] PrefindLast ∗ true)
4d // M1 := ls(y, null) ∧ y6=null M := M ∗M1
4e // ∆ ∗M1 ` [y/x] PrefindLast ∗ R1 R1 := emp ∗ x=a ∧ y=b
5 findLast(y; z);
5a // ∆ := ([y/x] PostfindLast) ∗ R1
5b // ∆ 0 PostfindLast
5c // ∆ ∗ [M2] F PostfindLast M2 := ls(x, y) M := M ∗M2
6 } }
6a // PreunkProc := ∃w · [a/x, b/y] H
6b // PostunkProc := [a/x, b/y]M
Fig. 1. Verification of findLast calling an unknown procedure unkProc.
We take H (line 3b) as a crude precondition for the unknown procedure, since it denotes the
symbolic heap that is accessible, and hence potentially usable, by the unknown call. The frame part
R0 is not touched by the unknown call and will remain in the post-state, as shown in line 4a.
At line 4a, the abstract state after the unknown call consists of two parts: one is the aforesaid
frame R0 not accessed by the call, and the other is due to the procedure’s postcondition which
is unfortunately not available. Our next step is to discover the postcondition by examining (the
requirements of) the code fragment after the unknown call by doing abductive reasoning (lines 4a
to 5c).
Initially, we assume the unknown procedure having an empty heapM0 as its postcondition,3 and
gradually discover the missing parts of the postcondition during the symbolic execution of the code
fragment after the unknown call. To do that, our analysis keeps track of a pair (∆,M) at each program
point, where∆ refers to the current heap state, andM denotes the expected postcondition discovered
so far for the unknown procedure. The notation Mi is used to represent parts of the discovered
postcondition.
At line 5, the procedure findLast is called recursively. Since the current heap state does not
satisfy the precondition of findLast (as shown in line 4b), the verification fails. However, this is not
necessarily due to a program error; it may be due to the fact that the unknown call’s postcondition is
3 Note that we introduce fresh logical variables a and b to record the values of x and ywhen unkProc returns.
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still unknown. Therefore, our analysis performs an abductive reasoning (line 4c) to infer the missing
partM1 for∆ such that∆ ∗M1 entails the precondition of findLast w.r.t. some substitution [y/x].
As shown in line 4d,M1 is inferred to be ls(y, null)∧ y6=null, which is accumulated intoM as part
of the expected postcondition of the unknown procedure. (We will explain the details for abductive
reasoning in Section 4.) Now the heap state combined with the inferredM1 meets the precondition of
the procedure findLast, and also generates a residual frame heap R1 (line 4e).
The heap state ∆ immediately after the recursive call (line 5a) is formed by findLast’s
postcondition and the frame R1, and it is expected to establish the postcondition of findLast for
the overall verification to succeed. However, it does not (as shown in line 5b). Again this might be due
to the fact that part of the unknown call’s postcondition is still missing. Therefore, we perform further
abductive reasoning (line 5c) to infer the missingM2 as follows:
ls(y, z) ∗ z 7→null ∧ x=a ∧ y=b ∗ [M2] F ls(x, z) ∗ z 7→null
such that ∆ ∗ M2 entails PostfindLast. In this case, our abductor returns M2 := ls(x, y) as the result
which is then added intoM by separation conjunction, as shown in line 5c.
Finally, we generate the expected pre/post-specification for the unknown procedure (lines 6a and
6b). The precondition is obtained from the local pre-state of the unknown call, H , by replacing all
variables that are aliases of a (or b) with the formal parameter a (or b). The postcondition is obtained
from the accumulated abduction result, M, after performing the same substitution. Our discovered
specification for the unknown procedure unkProc(a;b) is
PreunkProc := ∃w · a7→w ∗ ls(w, null) ∧ a6=null ∧ w 6=null
PostunkProc := ls(a, b) ∗ ls(b, null) ∧ b6=null.
The entire program is correct if unkProcmeets the derived specification.
3. The programming language and the abstract domain
In this section, we first depict the syntax of a language in which programs may invoke unknown
procedures, and then present the abstract domain for our analysis.
To focus only on key issues, we use a simple imperative language:
E =df x | null
b =df E1=E2 | E1 6=E2
A[E] =df [E] := E1 | dispose(E) | x := [E]
A =df x := E | x := new(E) | skip
C =df A[E] | A | f (x; y) | C1; C2 |
if b then C1 else C2 fi | while b do C od
U =df unkFn(x; y) | { unkFn(x0; y0); C1;
unkFn(x1; y1); C2; . . . ; Cn−1; unkFn(xn; yn)} |
if b then V else C fi | if b then C else V fi |
if b then V1 else V2 fi | while b do V od
V =df { C1;U(x1;y1); C2 }(x0;y0)
P =df · | P; f (x; ref y) { local z; C } |
P; f (x; ref y) { local z; V }
Note that expressions (E) are program variables for recording memory locations in the heap, and all
program variables are assumed of the same type, reference. The language has both heap-sensitive
(A[E]) and heap-insensitive (A) atomic commands. The former require access to the heap location
referred to by E, while the latter do not. The command C contains calls to known procedures only,
while the commands U and V comprise unknown procedure calls. Note also that our language allows
both call-by-value and call-by-reference parameters for procedures, and for convenience, we group
call-by-value parameters on the left and call-by-reference ones on the right, separated by a semicolon.
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The unknown commands U and V specify the possible scenarios in which an unknown call
(unkFn(x; y)) may occur. Note that U and V may be annotated with two sets of variables, e.g. (x0, y0)
in the definition of V , where x0 denotes variables that can be accessed, but cannot be modified by V ,
and where y0 denotes variables that may be mutated by V . The same annotation applies to U . These
annotations can be obtained automatically via a pre-processing phase of the analysis, by recording
all the variables appearing in V as the right (left) value of an assignment, and/or as a call-by-value
(call-by-reference) parameter of a procedure invocation (Nielson et al., 2005).
Example 2 (Unknown Procedure and Unknown Block). The parse tree of findLast’s body (omitting
the local variable definition) in our motivating example is as in Fig. 2. 
V ({. . .}(x;w,y,z))
ggggg
ggggg
ggg
WWWWW
WWWWW
WWWW
C(w := x.next) U(x,w;y,z) C(skip)
if (w == null) then C(z := x) else V ({. . .}(x;y,z))
ccccccccc
ccccccccc
ccccccccc
ccccc
ggggg
ggggg
gggg
C(skip) U(x;y)(unkProc(x; y)) C(findLast(y, z))
Fig. 2. The parse tree of findLast’s body.
A program P is composed of several procedures (with one of them as the entry method). A
procedure can be totally known to the verifier (and so its body is composed by C), or it may contain
an unknown block V .
We use amemory model similar to the standard one for separation logic (Reynolds, 2002):
Stack =df (Var ∪ LVar ∪ SVar)→ Val
Val =df Loc ∪ {null}
Heap =df Loc⇀ Val
State =df Stack× Heap.
The slight difference is that we have three (disjoint) set of variables: a finite set of program variables
Var = {x, y, . . .}, logical variables LVar = {x′, y′, . . .}, and the special (logical) variables SVar =
{a, b, . . .}, with the last set reserved for unknown procedures for specification purposes. As usual, Loc
is a countably infinite set of locations, subsumed by the set of values Val. The function Heap denotes
a partial mapping from locations to values and a program state is a pair of stack and heap.
An abstract (program) state in our analysis is a symbolic heap representing a set of concrete heaps.
It is defined as follows:
E =df x | x′ | a Expressions
Π =df E1=E2 | E1 6=E2 | true |Π1∧Π2 Pure formulae
B(E1, E2)=df E1 7→E2 | ls(E1, E2) Basic separation predicates
Σ =df B(E1, E2) | true | emp |Σ1 ∗Σ2 Separation formulae
∆ =df Π ∧Σ Quantifier-free symbolic heaps
H =df ∃x.∆ Symbolic heaps.
The expressions (x, x′ and a) correspond to the three kinds of variables (program, logical and special
ones). Pure formulae Π express the aliasing information among expressions. The basic separation
predicate B(E1, E2) denotes either a singleton heap or a list segment (Calcagno et al., 2009; Distefano
et al., 2006; Nguyen et al., 2007). A (possibly empty) list segment is inductively defined as follows:
ls(E1, E2) =df (emp ∧ E1=E2) ∨ (∃E3 · E1 7→E3 ∗ ls(E3, E2)).
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Here the list segment predicate is regarded as a built-in predicate in our abstract domain, as our
abstract semantics and abduction are fine-tuned for it. According to SpaceInvader (Calcagno et al.,
2009) we may extend it with other predicates. A symbolic heap H is composed of a pure formula
Π and a separation formula Σ , possibly with existential quantifications over them. The separation
formulaΣ is formed by the predicates B(E1, E2), true (arbitrary heaps) and emp (an empty heap) via
separation conjunction (Reynolds, 2002). We use SH to denote the set of all symbolic heaps and we
will use the two terms ‘‘symbolic heap’’ and ‘‘abstract state’’ interchangeably.
The semantics of a symbolic heap H (Berdine et al., 2004, 2005) is defined by the satisfaction
relationship (s, h) |H H between a pair of stack and heap states (s, h) and H , where s ∈ Stack and
h ∈ Heap:
|[x]|s =df s(x) |[null]|s =df null
(s, h) |H E1=E2 =df |[E1]|s = |[E2]|s (s, h) |H E1 6=E2 =df |[E1]|s 6= |[E2]|s
(s, h) |H Π1 ∧Π2 =df (s, h) |H Π1 and (s, h) |H Π2
(s, h) |H true =df always
(s, h) |H emp =df h = ∅ (s, h) |H E1 7→E2 =df h = {|[E1]|s7→|[E2]|s}
(s, h) |H Σ1 ∗Σ2 =df h = h1 ∪ h2 and (s, h1) |H Σ1 and (s, h2) |H Σ2
where h1 and h2 are domain-disjoint
and the semantics of ls(E1, E2) can be obtained from its inductive definition over the abstract domain.
On the basis of such semantics, the entailment relationship between two symbolic heaps H1 and H2 is
straightforward:
H1 ` H2 =df ∀s, h · (s, h) |H H1 implies (s, h) |H H2
which is used to check whether one symbolic heap is stronger than another in our analysis.
4. Abduction
As shown in Example 1 (Section 2), when analyzing the code after an unknown call, due to the
lack of information about the unknown procedure, it is possible that the current state is too weak to
meet the required precondition for the next instruction. As a consequence, the symbolic execution
fails. A technique called abduction (or abductive reasoning) (Calcagno et al., 2009; Giacobazzi, 1994)
can be used to discover a symbolic heapM to make the entailment∆ ∗M ` H ∗ R succeed when the
entailment ∆ ` H ∗ R fails. Here R denotes the (automatically computed) frame part. For instance,
the entailments at line 4b and line 5b failed in Example 1, and in both cases, the abduction algorithm
was called to find the missingM.
One problem in abduction is that there can bemany solutions ofM for the entailment∆∗M ` H∗R
to succeed. For instance, false can be a solution but should be avoided where possible. As another
example, for the entailment ls(y, z) ∗M ` ls(x, z) ∗ R (a similar one appeared at line 5c in Example 1
in Section 2), an abductive reasoning may return, for example, two different solutions: M = ls(x, y)
with R = emp orM = ls(x, z) with R = ls(y, z). A partial order over symbolic heaps was given by
Calcagno et al. (2009) to make the selection from different solutions:
M  M′ =df (M′ ` M ∗ true ∧M 0 M′ ∗ true)∨
(M′ ` M ∗ true ∧M ` M′ ∗ true ∧M′ ` M).
Intuitively speaking, consider two symbolic heaps M and M′; if M′ entails M (possibly extended by
some frame), then M is less than M′ under . For example, we have ls(x, y)  ls(x, y) ∗ ls(y, z), and
emp ∨ ∃x, y.ls(x, y)  emp.
With such partial order, we can judge the quality of different solutions for abduction by always
choosing the least one according to.
Two solutions cannot be distinguished when they are not comparable under this partial order.
However, we may still prefer one solution over another in this case, as will be discussed in Section 6.
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We would expect the solution to incur as few free variables as possible in the frame part (R). For this
reason, we define a new order as follows:
M ∆H M′ =df MM′ ∨ (MM′ ∧M′M ∧
∆ ∗M ` H ∗ R ∧∆ ∗M′ ` H ∗ R′ ∧
|fv(R)| ≤ |fv(R′)|).
Note that our partial order is defined over the set of solutions for one abduction. Intuitively, given two
solutions which are not comparable w.r.t., our partial ordermay still be able to compare them if one
incurs fewer free variables in the frame R than the other. To ensure that the abductor will choose the
former, but not the latter, we enrich the abductor (Calcagno et al., 2009) with some new rules (right
column below) so that it attempts to introduce less free variables in the frame, where possible:
∆ ∗ [M] F∆′ ∆ ∗ B(E, E ′) 0 false
∆ ∗ [M ∗ B(E, E ′)] F∆′ ∗ B(E, E ′) missing
(E0=E1 ∧∆) ∗ [M] F ∃y′.∆′
∆ ∗ E0 7→E ∗ [∃x′.E0=E1 ∧M]F
∃x′y′.∆′ ∗ E1 7→E
t-match
(E 6=E0 ∧∆ ∗ ls(x, E0)) ∗ [M] F∆′
∆ ∗ ls(E, E0) ∗ [E 6=E0 ∧M] F
∃x.∆′ ∗ E 7→x
h-left
E 6=E0 ∧∆ ∗ ls(E0, x′) ∗ [M] F ∃y′.∆′
∆ ∗ ls(E0, E) ∗ [E0 6=E ∧M]F
∃x′y′.∆′ ∗ x′ 7→E
t-left
∆ ∗ [M] F∆′ ∗ ls(E0, E1)
∆ ∗ B(E, E0) ∗ [M] F∆′ ∗ ls(E, E1) h-right
∆ ∗ [M] F ∃x′.∆′ ∗ ls(E0, E1)
∆ ∗ B(E0, E) ∗ [M] F ∃x′.∆′ ∗ B(E1, E) t-right
where the rules fromCalcagno et al. (2009) are on the left and our newones are on the right. Compared
with their form, when the matching from the head of a list segment fails, our abductor also tries
to match from the tail, instead of directly applying the missing rule to introduce a new separation
predicate, which could bring in more free variables in the frame. In our case, the rule t-match
introduces aliasing information between two heads of pointing-to relationships in the premise and
conclusion of the abduction. The last two rules try to match from the end of a basic separation
predicate; if the matching succeeds then the matched part will be dropped from both sides to reduce
the complexity of the predicates. For instance, in Example 1 in Section 2, for the last abduction
∃y . ls(y, z) ∗ z 7→null ∗ [M] F ls(x, z) ∗ z 7→null
their abductor will return ls(x, z) asM, by trying tomatch the heads of the list segments on both sides
of F, and adding the missing heap part to the left hand side once the matching fails. This solution
is not optimal in view of the fact that it introduces a free variable z in the frame. Comparatively,
our abduction tries to match also from the tail of a list segment, finding ls(x, y) as the result for the
aforesaid abduction, which is a minimal solution under our partial order∆H .
We prefer to find solutions that are (potentially locally) minimal with respect to ∆H and
consistent. However, such solutions are generally not easy to compute and can incur excess cost
(with additional disjunction in the analysis). Therefore, our abductive inference is designed more
from a practical perspective for discovering anti-frames that should be suitable as specifications for
unknown procedures, and the order ∆H is used to state the decision choices of our implementation
of the abduction. This is proven in Section 7 with the experiments that we conduct.
5. Abstract semantics
This section introduces two kinds of abstract semantics that we use to analyze the program: an
underlying semantics from the local shape analysis (Distefano et al., 2006) and another semantics
based on both the first one and abduction from the composite shape analysis (Calcagno et al., 2009).
We denote the specifications of a procedure f (x; y) as a subset of SH×(SH∪{>}) (where> stands
for a fault abstract state). Note that for a call-by-reference parameter x, both old(x) and xmay occur
in a postcondition with the former referring to the value of x in the pre-state (as in JML (Müller et al.,
2003)). To illustrate, a postcondition ls(old(x), x) means that there is a list segment beginning with
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the initial value of x (present in the precondition) and going to the final xwhen the procedure returns.
The set of all specifications for all procedures is defined as
AllSpec =df P (Name× P (SH× (SH ∪ {>})))
where Name refers to the set of all function names. Then our underlying abstract semantics’ type is
defined as
|[C]| : AllSpec→ P>(SH)→ P>(SH)
where P>(SH) stands for P (SH ∪ {>}). Given a program C , a specification table T ∈ AllSpec, and a
set of abstract states S, |[C]|T S returns another set of abstract states.
Example 3 (Underlying Semantics). For the findLast in our motivating example, suppose the
specification table T is
{(findLast(a, b), {(ls(a, null) ∧ a6=null, ls(a, b) ∗ b7→null)})}.
Then we know that the symbolic execution |[findLast(x, y)]|T {ls(x, null) ∧ x6=null} will give{ls(x, y) ∗ y7→null} as a result. 
The basic transition functions below form the foundation of the first underlying semantics. With
one symbolic heap as input, they return either another symbolic heap or a set of symbolic heaps:
rearr(E) =df SH→ P>(SH[E]) Rearrangement
exec(A[E]) =df SH[E] → SH ∪ {>} Heap-sensitive execution
exec(A) =df SH→ SH Heap-insensitive execution
abs =df SH→ SH Abstraction
where SH(E) denotes the set of symbolic heaps in which each element has E exposed as the head
in one of its pointing-to conjuncts (E 7→F ). Here rearr(E) attempts to unroll the shape beginning
with E to expose it as the head of a pointing-to predicate, say, E points to another expression. (If
such unrolling fails then it will return {>}.) This is a preparation for the second transition function
exec(A[E]), as it tries to perform some dereference of E. The third function, like the semantics for
stack-based variable assignment and heap allocation, does not require such exposure of E, and thus is
called heap-insensitive compared with the second one. The last transition function conducts a rolling
over the shapes, to eliminate unimportant cutpoints to ensure termination for our verification.
The rules for the basic transition functions are adopted from Distefano et al. (2006), where the
logical variable x′′ is always fresh.
Below are the rules for rearrangement, where we try to find an explicit pointing-to beginning with
the expression E to be unrolled (or its alias). If such unrolling fails then {>} is returned.
rearr(E) (∃x′.Π∧∆ ∗ ls(G, F)) =df ifΠ ` G=E then
{∃x′.Π∧E=F∧∆, ∃x′.Π∧∆ ∗ E 7→F ,
∃x′, x′′.Π∧∆ ∗ E 7→x′′ ∗ ls(x′′, F)} else {>}
| (∃x′.Π∧∆ ∗ G7→F) =df ifΠ ` G=E then
{∃x′.Π∧∆ ∗ E 7→F} else {>}
| (∃x′.Π∧∆) =df {>}.
Below are rules for symbolic execution to reflect the effects, over a heap or not, of atomic
commands.
exec (x := E)(∃x′.Π∧∆) =df ∃x′.x=[x′′/x]E ∧ [x′′/x](Π∧∆)
exec (x := [E])(∃x′.Π∧∆ ∗ E 7→F) =df ∃x′.x=[x′′/x]F ∧ [x′′/x](Π∧∆ ∗ E 7→F)
| (∃x′.Π∧∆) =df >
exec ([E] := G)(∃x′.Π∧∆ ∗ E 7→F) =df ∃x′.Π∧∆ ∗ E 7→G
| (∃x′.Π∧∆) =df >
exec (x := new(E))(∃x′.Π∧∆) =df ∃x′.[x′′/x](Π∧∆) ∗ x7→[x′′/x]E
exec (dispose(E))(∃x′.Π∧∆ ∗ E 7→F) =df ∃x′.Π∧∆
| (∃x′.Π∧∆) =df >.
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Below are definitions of rules for abstraction. Their rationale is to remove any heap garbage from
the current state and eliminate logical cutpoints that are neither shared nor essential in denoting a
cyclic list over the heap. In our semantics, when the abstraction is actually performed, the six rules
are applied for several rounds, with each round from the top one to the bottom, until the abstracted
state does not change any more. Its termination is discussed later in Section 6.2.
∃z′. E=x′ ∧Π ∧Σ  ∃z′. [E/x′]Π ∧Σ Equality
x′ /∈LVar(Σ)
∃z′. E 6=x′ ∧Π ∧Σ  ∃z′.Π ∧Σ Disequality
x′ /∈LVar(Π,Σ)
∃z′.Π ∧Σ ∗ B(x′, E)  ∃z′.Π ∧Σ ∗ true Junk1
x′, y′ /∈LVar(Π,Σ)
∃z′.Π ∧Σ ∗ B(x′, y′) ∗ B(y′, x′)  ∃z′.Π ∧Σ ∗ true Junk2
x′ /∈LVar(Π,Σ, E, F) Π ` F=null
∃z′.Π ∧Σ ∗ B1(E, x′) ∗ B(x′, F)  ∃z′.Π ∧Σ ∗ ls(E, null) Abs1
x′ /∈LVar(Π,Σ, E, F , E1, F1) Π ` F=E1
∃z′.Π ∧Σ ∗ B1(E, x′) ∗ B(x′, F) ∗ B(E1, F1)  ∃z′.Π ∧Σ ∗ ls(E, F) ∗ B(E1, F1) Abs2.
A lifting function pĎ is defined over partial functions on symbolic heaps to lift their domains and
ranges to a powerset of SH, plus>:
pĎS =df {> | > ∈ S} ∪ {p H | H ∈ S \ {>}}
and this function is overloaded for rearr only to lift its domain to P>(SH):
rearr(E)ĎS =df {>|>∈S} ∪
( ⋃
H∈S\{>}
rearr(E) H
)
.
The following function, filt, is to filter out any symbolic heap that does not satisfy the given aliasing
constraint:
filt(E=F)(H) =df if H 0 E 6=F then H ∧ E=F else undefined
filt(E 6=F)(H) =df if H 0 E=F then H ∧ E 6=F else undefined
and the program constructors’ semantics is based on the atomic ones defined above:
|[b]|T S =df filt(b)ĎS
|[A[E]]|T S =df absĎ ◦ exec(A[E])Ď ◦ rearr(E)ĎS
|[A]|T S =df absĎ ◦ exec(A)ĎS
|[C1; C2]|T S =df |[C2]|T ◦ |[C1]|T S
|[if b then C1 else C2 fi]|T S =df |[b; C1]|T S ∪ |[¬b; C2]|T S
|[while b do C od]|T S =df |[¬b]|T (lfix λS′.S ∪ |[b; C]|T S′).
Finally we need to adapt the underlying abstract semantics to procedure invocation:
|[f (x; y)]|T S =df {[x/a, y/b, y′/old(b)]Post ∗ [y′/y]R |∆∈S ∧
(Pre, Post)∈Specf ∧∆ ` [x/a, y/b]Pre ∗ R}
where (f ,Specf ) ∈ T and y′ are fresh
where T is an element of AllSpec. We assume here that the formal parameters in f ’s specifications
are expressed in terms of a, b and old(b), respectively. We first check whether the procedure’s
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precondition is satisfied by the current state (subject to substitution), and then replace it with the
(substituted) postcondition to indicate the effect of the procedure call.
Nextwe define the abstract semanticswith abduction used in our verification to discover the effect
of unknown procedure calls.
|[C]|A : AllSpec→ P>(SH× SH)→ P>(SH× SH).
Here P>(SH × SH) denotes P ((SH ∪ {>}) × (SH ∪ {>})). Given a specification table T ∈ AllSpec,
each element of the input (or output) for |[C]|AT is a pair of two symbolic heaps, of which the first
denotes the current program state, and the second stands for the abduction result. In our framework,
this semantics is used to accumulate the discovered effect of unknown procedure calls into the second
symbolic heap in the pair.
Example 4 (Abstract Semantics with Abduction). Consider the same setting for findLast in Exam-
ple 3. For the semantics with abduction |[findLast(x, y)]|AT {ls(x, null)}, we will have {(ls(x, y) ∗
y7→null, x6=null)} as the result. Here in order to obtain the first component of the pair as the final
state (ls(x, y)∗y7→null), the second component (x6=null) must be added to its corresponding input
state ls(x, null). 
This semantics also consists of the basic transition functions which compose the atomic
instructions’ semantics and then the program constructors’ semantics. Here the basic transition
functions are lifted as follows:
Rearr(E)(H,M) =df
letH=rearr(E)(H) and S={(H ′,M)|H ′ ∈ H ∩ SH}
in if (> /∈ H) then S
else if (H ` E=a for some a ∈ SVar) and (M 0 a7→x′ for fresh x′ ∈ LVar)
then S ∪ {(H ∗ E 7→x′,M ∗ a7→x′)} else S ∪ {>}
Exec(A)(H,M) =df letH=exec(A)(H)in {(H ′,M)|H ′ ∈ H} ∪ {>|> ∈ H}
where A is [E] := G or dispose(E)
Exec(x := E)(∃x′.Π∧∆,M) =df (∃x′.x=σE ∧ σ(Π∧∆), σM)
Exec(x := [E])(∃x′.Π∧∆ ∗ E 7→F) =df (∃x′.x=σ F ∧ σ(Π∧∆ ∗ E 7→F), σM)
| (∃x′.Π∧∆) =df if ∃x′.Π∧∆ ∗ E 7→F ` false then (>, σM)
else (∃x′.x=σ F ∧ σ(Π∧∆ ∗ E 7→F), σ (M ∗ E 7→F))
Exec(x := new(E))(∃x′.Π∧∆) =df (∃x′.σ (Π∧∆) ∗ x7→σE, σM)
Abs(H,M) =df (abs(H), abs(M)).
In the lifted Rearr, in case of a rearrangement failure, we utilize abduction to discover a pointing-to
in the current heap, followed by another attempt at rearrangement. If it succeeds, then the abduction
result is confirmed and added to the current state. Note that in the definition of Exec we need to
treat variable assignments specifically. As can be seen in the rules, when x is assigned to a new value,
the original value is still preserved in a fresh logical variable x′′ with a substitution σ = [x′′/x]. This
allows us to keep the connection among the history values of a variable and its latest value, which
may be essential as a link from the unknown procedure’s postcondition to its caller’s postcondition.
This is because the unknown procedure’s postconditionmay refer to one of such a variable’s historical
values, and its caller’s postcondition can count on that variable’s final value. In that case, the recorded
values in the abduction results will serve as a connection among these abstract states. Abs simply
performs abstraction over both H andM.
The filter function Filt now only works on the first symbolic heap of a pair:
Filt(b)(H,M) =df (filt(b)(H),M)
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and the abstract semantics for the program constructors is as follows:
|[b]|AT S =df Filt(b)ĎS
|[A[E]]|AT S =df AbsĎ ◦ Exec(A[E])Ď ◦ Rearr(E)ĎS
|[A]|AT S =df AbsĎ ◦ Exec(A)ĎS
|[C1; C2]|AT S =df |[C2]|AT ◦ |[C1]|AT S
|[if b then C1 else C2 fi]|AT S =df |[b; C1]|AT S ∪ |[¬b; C2]|AT S
|[while b do C od]|AT S =df |[¬b]|AT (lfix λS′.S ∪ |[b; C]|AT S′).
Like above, finally we have the semantics for procedure invocation with abduction:
|[f (x; y)]|AT S =df {([x/a, y/b, y′/old(b)]Post ∗ [y′/y]R, [y′/y]M) | (∆,M)∈S ∧
(Pre, Post)∈Specf ∧∆ ` [x/a, y/b]Pre ∗ R} ∪{([x/a, y/b, y′/old(b)]Post ∗ [y′/y]R, [y′/y](M ∗M′)) |
(∆,M)∈S ∧ (Pre, Post)∈Specf ∧∆0[x/a, y/b]Pre ∗ R∧
∆ ∗ [M′] F [x/a, y/b]Pre}
where (f ,Specf ) ∈ T and y′ are fresh
where T is an element of AllSpec. We also use a, b and old(b) for formal parameters in the
specification. This rule distinguishes two cases: 1. the current state in S is sufficiently strong to
entail Pre subject to some substitutions, and the corresponding postcondition is established; 2. the
current state does not entail substituted Pre, and abduction is applied with further requirements on
the current state accumulated (M′). It will combine the results from the two cases to update the state
after the procedure invocation and continue with the symbolic execution.
6. Verification
On the basis of the abstract semantics defined in the last section, we present in this section our
algorithms for the verification of programs with unknown calls.
6.1. The main verification algorithm
1. The main algorithm. Our verification algorithm given in Fig. 3 attempts to verify the body of
the current procedure (the third input, comprising an unknown command U) against the given
specifications (the second input). The first input gives a set of known procedure specifications, which
are necessary as the current procedure may invoke known procedures besides unknown ones. If
the verification succeeds, it returns specifications that are expected for all unknown procedures
invoked within U for the whole verification to succeed. If it fails, we know that the current procedure
cannot meet one or more given specifications, no matter what specifications are given to the invoked
unknown procedures. Returned specifications will be expressed using special variables a, b, etc. as in
the earlier example.
For each specification (Pre, Post) to verify against (line 2), the algorithm works in three steps. On
the basis of the underlying semantics mentioned earlier, it first computes the post-states of C1 (i.e.
S0) from Pre (line 3), from which it extracts the preconditions for U(x;y) using the function Local.
Intuitively, it extracts the part of each ∆1 reachable from the variables that may be accessed by U ,
namely, x and y (line 6). Here fv(∆) stands for all free (program and logical) variables occurring in∆.
The function Local(Π ∧Σ, {x}) is defined as follows:
Local(Π∧Σ, {x}) =df ∃fv(Π∧Σ) \ ReachVar(Π∧Σ, {x}) ·
Π ∗ ReachHeap(Π∧Σ, {x})
where ReachVar(Π∧Σ, {x}) is the minimal set of variables reachable from {x}:
{x} ∪ {z2 | ∃z1,Π1 · z1∈ReachVar(Π∧Σ, {x}) ∧Π=(z1=z2) ∧Π1} ∪
{z2 | ∃z1,Σ1 · z1∈ReachVar(Π∧Σ, {x}) ∧Σ=B(z1, z2) ∗Σ1} ⊆ ReachVar(Π∧Σ, {x})
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Verify : AllSpec× P (SH× SH)× V ⇀ AllSpec ∪ {fail}
Algorithm Verify(T ,SpecV , {C1;U(x;y); C2}(x0;y0))
1 SpecU := ∅
2 foreach (Pre, Post) ∈ SpecV do
3 S0 := |[C1]|T {Pre ∧ y0=old(y0)}
4 if> ∈ S0 then return fail endif
5 foreach∆1 ∈ S0 do
6 PreU := Local(∆1, {x, y})
7 Denote z = fv(PreU) \ {x, y}
8 S := |[C2]|AT {([old(b)/y]Frame(∆1, {x, y}) ∧
x=a ∧ y=b ∧ z=c, emp ∧ x=a ∧ y=b ∧ z=c)}
9 S′ := { (∆,M) | (∆,M)∈S ∧∆ ` Post ∗ true } ∪
{ (∆ ∗M′,M ∗M′) | (∆,M)∈S ∧
∆ 0 Post∗true ∧∆∗[M′] F Post }
10 if ∃(∆,M)∈S′ . fv(M) * ReachVar(∆, {a, b})
then return (fail,M) endif
11 foreach (∆,M) ∈ S′ do
12 PreU := [a/x, b/y, c/z]PreU
13 PostU := sub_alias(M, {a, b, c})
14 g := (fv(PreU) ∩ fv(PostU)) ∪ {a, b}
15 SpecU := SpecU ∪ {(∃(fv(PreU)\g) · PreU , PostU)}
16 end foreach
17 end foreach
18 end foreach
19 TU := CaseAnalysis(T ,SpecU ,U)
20 Post_Check(T unionmultiTU ,SpecV , {C1;U; C2})
21 return T unionmultiTU
end Algorithm
Fig. 3. The main verification algorithm.
whereB(z1, z2) stands for either z1 7→z2 or ls(z1, z2). And the formulaReachHeap(Π∧Σ, {x}) denotes
the part of Σ reachable from {x} and is formally defined as the ∗-conjunction of the following set of
formulae:
{Σ1 | ∃z1, z2,Σ2 · z1∈ReachVar(Π∧Σ, {x}) ∧Σ=Σ1∗Σ2 ∧Σ1=B(z1, z2)}.
The second step is to symbolically execute C2, using the abstract semantics with abduction, to
discover the postconditions for U(x;y) (lines 8–10). At line 8, since we know nothing about U , we take
emp as the post-state of U . Therefore, the initial state for the symbolic execution of C2 is simply the
frame part of state not touched by U . Here Frame is formally defined as
Frame(Π∧Σ, {x}) =df Π ∧ UnreachHeap(Π∧Σ, {x})
where UnreachHeap(Π∧Σ, {x}) is the formula consisting of all ∗-conjuncts from Σ which are not
in ReachHeap(Π∧Σ, {x}).
Note that x=a ∧ y=b ∧ z=c are used to record the snapshot of variables associated with U using
the special variables a, b and c. The symbolic execution of C2 at line 8 returns a set S of pairs (∆,M)
where ∆ is a possible post-state of C2 and M records the discovered effect of U . At line 9, we check
whether or not each ∆ can establish the postcondition Post for the whole procedure. If not, another
abduction∆∗[M′] F Post is invoked to discover further effectM′ which is then added intoM.
There can be some complication here. Note that there can be a potential bug in the program,
or the given specification may not be sufficient. As a consequence of that, the result M returned
by our abductor may contain more information than can be expected from U , in which case
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we cannot simply regard the whole of M as the postcondition of U . For example, consider the
code fragment unknown(x); z:=y.next with the precondition x7→null. Before the second
instruction (dereference of y.next) we use abduction to get y6=null. However, noting the fact that
y/∈ReachVar(∆, {x})where∆=emp∧ y6=null is the state immediately after the unknown call plus
the abduction result, we know that from the unknown call’s parameters (x), y is not reachable, and
hence the unknown call will never establish a state where y6=null. In that case we are assured that
the procedure being verified cannot meet the specification.
To detect such a situation, we introduce the check in line 10. It tests whether the whole abduction
result is reachable from variables accessed by U . If not, then the unreachable part cannot be expected
from U , which indicates a possible bug in the program or some inconsistency between the program
and its specification. In such cases, the algorithm returns an additional formula that can be used by a
further analysis to either identify the bug or strengthen the specification. Recall the example presented
in the previous paragraph: since y6=null cannot be established by the unknown call, if we add it to
the precondition of the code fragment (to form a new precondition x7→null ∧ y6=null), then the
verification with the new specification can move on and will potentially succeed. We will exemplify
this later with experimental results.
The third step (lines 11–16) is to form the derived specifications forU in terms of variables a, b and
g , where g denotes logical variables not directly accessed by U , but occurring in both preconditions
and postconditions. The formula sub_alias(M, {a, b, c}) is obtained fromM by replacing all variables
with their aliases in {a, b, c}. It is defined as
sub_alias(M, {x}) =df ({[x/x′] | x∈{x} ∧ x′∈aliases(M, x)}M)∧∧{x = x′ | x, x′∈{x} ∧ x′∈aliases(M, x)}
where a set of substitutions before a formulaM denotes the result of applying all those substitutions
toM, and aliases(M, x) returns all the aliases of x inM.
Finally, at line 19, the specifications SpecU obtained for U are passed to the case analysis algorithm
(given in Fig. 4) to derive the specifications of unknown procedures invoked in U . At line 20, we
conduct a post-analysis for soundness purposes.
2. The case analysis algorithm. In order to discover specifications for unknown procedures invoked
in U , the algorithm in Fig. 4 conducts a case analysis according to the structure of U . In the first
case (line 2), U is simply an unknown call. In this situation, the algorithm simply returns all the
precondition/postcondition pairs from SpecU as the unknown procedure’s specifications.
In the second case (line 4), U is an if construct and each branch contains an unknown block. The
algorithm uses the main algorithm to verify the two branches separately with preconditions Pre∧b
and Pre∧¬b respectively, where Pre is one of the preconditions of the whole if. The results obtained
from the two branches are then combined using the unionmulti operator:
R1 unionmulti R2 =df {(f,Refine(Spec1f ∪ Spec2f )) | (f,Spec1f )∈R1 ∧ (f,Spec2f )∈R2}
where Refine is defined as
Refine (∅) =df ∅
Refine ({(Pre, Post)} ∪ Spec)=df if ∃(Pre′, Post′)∈Spec · Pre′Pre ∧ PostPost′
then Refine(Spec)
else {(Pre, Post)} ∪ Refine(Spec).
The intuition of Refine is to eliminate any specification (Pre′, Post′) from a set if there exists a
‘‘stronger’’ one, (Pre, Post), such that PrePre′ and Post′Post. unionmulti is to refine the union of two
specification sets.
The third and fourth cases (line 10 and 15) are for if constructs which contain one unknown block
in one branch. This is handled in like in the second case. The only difference is that, for the branch
without unknown blocks, we need to verify it with the underlying semantics (line 13).
The fifth case is the while loop. In the motivating example in Section 2, we have shown that
our approach is able to handle the verification of a tail-recursive function provided with both
preconditions and postconditions; our solution here is to translate the while loop into a tail-recursive
function to verify it. As can be seen in lines 16–20, the algorithm generates a new function loop for
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CaseAnalysis : AllSpec× P (SH× SH)× U ⇀ AllSpec ∪ {fail}
Algorithm CaseAnalysis(T ,SpecU ,U)
1 switch U
2 case unkFn(x; y)
3 return {(unkFn,SpecU)}
4 case if b then V1 else V2 fi
5 SpecT := {(Pre∧b, Post) | (Pre, Post) ∈ SpecU }
6 SpecF := {(Pre∧¬b, Post) | (Pre, Post) ∈ SpecU }
7 R1 := Verify(T ,SpecT , V1)
8 R2 := Verify(T ,SpecF , V2)
9 return R1 unionmulti R2
10 case if b then V else C fi
11 SpecT := {(Pre∧b, Post) | (Pre, Post) ∈ SpecU }
12 R := Verify(T ,SpecT , V )
13 if ∃(Pre, Post) ∈ SpecU ,∆ ∈ |[C]|T {Pre ∧ ¬b} ·
∆=>∨∆ 0 Post∗true then return fail
14 else return R endif
15 case if b then C else V fi (Similar to the previous case)
16 case while b do V od
17 Denote V as {C1;U(x1;y1); C2}(x;y)
18 Define loop(x; y){ if b then V ; loop(x; y) fi}
19 T ′ := T unionmulti { (loop,SpecU) }
20 return Verify(T ′,SpecU , {if b then V ; loop(x; y) fi}(x;y))
21 case unkFn(x0; y0); { ; Ci; unkFn(xi; yi)}ni=1
22 return {(unkFn,SeqUnkCalls(T ,SpecU ,U))}
end Algorithm
Fig. 4. The case analysis algorithm.
the while loop, and takes the variables accessed by V to be its parameters. Note that the read-only
variables (x) become call-by-value parameters and other possibly mutable ones (y) become call-by-
reference parameters (which is one reason for us to introduce call-by-reference parameters in our
language). The algorithm then adds the specifications found for the while loop as loop’s specifications
into table T , verifying it, and at the same time obtaining specifications for the unknown procedure in
the while loop, using the main algorithm Verify.
In the last case (line 21), where U consists of multiple unknown procedure calls in sequence, the
algorithm invokes another algorithm, SeqUnkCalls, to deal with it.
3. Verifying sequential unknown calls. To handle the most complicated case, unknown procedure
calls in sequence, we still need the SeqUnkCalls algorithm. First we illustrate the brief idea using two
sequential unknown procedure calls as an example, followed by the general algorithm.
Suppose we have
{Pre} {unkFn1(x0; y0); C; unkFn2(x1; y1)} {Post}
where C is the only known code fragment within the block. Our current solution attempts to find a
common specification to capture both unknown procedures’ behaviors.
The algorithm works in three steps. In the first step, it extracts the precondition for the first
procedure, say PreU , from the given precondition Pre by extracting the part of the heap that may
be accessed by the call via x0 and y0, which is similar to the first step of the main algorithm Verify.
Aiming at a general specification for both unknown calls, it then assumes that the second procedure
has a similar precondition PreU . In the second step, it symbolically executes the code fragment C with
the help of the abductor, to discover a crude postcondition, sayPost0U , expected from the first unknown
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call. This is similar to the second step of the main algorithm Verify, except that the postcondition for
C is now assumed to be PreU . In the third step, the algorithm takes Post0U (with appropriate variable
substitutions) as the postcondition of the second unknown call, and checkswhether or not the derived
postcondition (Post0U ) satisfies Post. If not, it invokes another abduction to strengthen Post
0
U to obtain
the final postcondition PostU for the unknownprocedures. Note that this strengthening does not affect
soundness: the strengthened PostU can still be used as a general postcondition for both unknown
procedures.
Fig. 5 presents the algorithm used to infer specifications for n (n ≥ 2) unknown calls in sequence.
As mentioned earlier, given a block of (n+1) unknown procedure calls with n pieces of known code
blocks sandwiched among them (unkFn(x0; y0) {; Ci; unkFn(xi; yi)}ni=1 in line 1), and the specification
(Pre, Post) (line 3) for such a block, our approach generally works in three steps: first, to compute
a precondition for the unknown calls; second, to verify each code fragment Ci (i = 1, . . . , n) with
abduction to collect expected behavior of the unknown calls (as part of their postcondition); third, to
guarantee that the collected postcondition satisfies Post. If not, then another abduction is conducted
to strengthen the postcondition obtained to ensure this.
The first step is completed by lines 4 to 6. The local part of Pre is extracted w.r.t. the first unknown
call’s parameters x0 and y0. Other free variables are distinguished as z0, whichmay be ghost variables.
Finally the precondition is found in terms of special logical variables a, b and c.
The second step is performed over each Ci; unkFn(xi; yi). Its main idea is to take the postcondition
generated for the last unknown call (Posti−1), plus the frame part during the entailment check
against Prei−1, as the post-state of unkFn(xi−1; yi−1), and try to verify Ci beginning with such a state,
using abduction when necessary (line 9). After the verification we get Si containing abstract states
before unkFn(xi; yi), and we want those states to satisfy its precondition PreU subject to substitution.
Note that during the verification of Ci and the last satisfaction checking we may use abduction to
strengthen the program state, whose results reflect the expected behavior of unkFn(xi−1; yi−1) and
are accumulated as its expected postcondition. Hence we achieve a sufficiently strong postcondition
for each unknown call.
The third step is similar to the first algorithm: it checks whether the final abstract state entails the
postcondition of the whole block, and strengthens the final abstract state with abduction if it cannot.
Then the ghost variables are recognized and processed like in the first algorithm. Finally the strongest
specifications discovered for those unknown procedures are returned.
Note that our current solution tries to find a common specification (Pre, Post) suitable for
all the unknown procedures. Generally we may allow the unknown procedures to have different
specifications. In theory, this can be achieved by amore in-depth analysis which examines the known
code fragments in between those unknown calls. That is, by analyzing the code fragment Ci we
would, we hope, obtain a postcondition for the (i−1)-th procedure and a precondition for the i-
th. In the case of two unknown calls unkFn0(x0; y0); C1; unkFn1(x1; y1), the precondition for unkFn0
and the postcondition for unkFn1 can be obtained as usual (by analyzing the code before unkFn0
and after unkFn1 respectively). To derive the postcondition Post0 for unkFn0 and the precondition
Pre1 for unkFn1, we initialize Post0 to be emp to start a forward analysis over C1 with abduction, to
accumulate (via abduction) the expected behavior of unkFn0 (for C1 to be verified) as Post0, and extract
a formula (which is relevant to the footprint of unkFn1) from the abstract state at the end of C1 as Pre1.
However, our initial experiments show that, unless the fragment C1 is sufficiently complex to expose
enough of the information expected from unkFn0, the derived Post0 and Pre1 can be rather weak. As
a consequence, the derived specification for unkFn0 can be too weak (with a weak postcondition) and
the one for unkFn1 can be too strong (with a weak precondition). It remains an open problem howwe
might tune the derived results to obtain more reasonable specifications. We conjecture that certain
heuristics might help and we will explore this further in our future work.
6.2. Soundness and termination
Informally, in the presence of unknown procedure calls, the soundness of the verification signifies
that a program is successfully verified against its specifications if all the unknown procedures that
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SeqUnkCalls : AllSpec× P (SH× SH)× U ⇀ P (SH× (SH ∪ {>}))
Algorithm SeqUnkCalls(T ,SpecU ,U)
1 Denote U as unkFn(x0; y0) {; Ci; unkFn(xi; yi)}ni=1
2 R := ∅
3 foreach (Pre, Post) ∈ SpecU do
4 PreU := Local(Pre, {x0, y0})
5 Denote z0 = fv(PreU) \ {x0, y0}
6 PreU := [a/x0, b/y0, c/z0]PreU
7 S′0 := {(Pre ∧ y0=old(y0), emp ∧ a=x0 ∧ b=y0 ∧ c=z0)}
8 for i := 1 to n do
9 Si := |[Ci]|AT { (Posti−1 ∗ [old(b)/yi−1] Frame(∆i−1, {xi−1, yi−1}), Posti−1) |
(∆i−1,Mi−1)∈S′i−1 ∧ Posti−1 = ([xi−1/a, yi−1/b, zi−1/c]sub_alias(
Mi−1, {a, b, c})) ∧ a=xi−1 ∧ b=yi−1 ∧ c=zi−1}where zi−1 is fresh
10 S′i := {(∆,M) | (∆,M)∈Si ∧ σ∆ ` ∃c · PreU∗true} ∪ {(∆ ∗M′,M ∗M′) |
(∆,M)∈Si ∧ σ∆ 0 ∃c · PreU∗true ∧ σ∆∗[M′] F ∃c · PreU }
where σ=[a/xi, b/yi]
11 if ∃(∆,M)∈S′i · fv(M) * ReachVar(∆, {a, b}) then
return (fail, Local(M, {x0, old(y0)})) endif
12 end for
13 Sn+1 := { (Postn∗[old(b)/yn]Frame(∆n, {xn, yn}), Postn) | (∆n,Mn)∈S′n ∧
Postn = ([xn/a, yn/b, zn/c]sub_alias(Mn, {a, b, c})) ∧
a=xn ∧ b=yn ∧ c=zn}where zn is fresh
14 S′n+1 := {(∆,M) | (∆,M)∈Sn+1 ∧∆ ` Post∗true} ∪ {(∆ ∗M′,M ∗M′) |
(∆,M)∈Sn+1 ∧∆ 0 Post∗true ∧∆∗[M′] F Post}
15 if ∃(∆,M)∈S′n+1 · fv(M) * ReachVar(∆, {a, b}) then
return (fail, Local(M, {x0, old(y0)})) endif
16 foreach (∆,M) ∈ S′n+1 do
17 PostU := sub_alias(M, {a, b, c})
18 g := fv(PreU) ∩ fv(PostU) \ {a, b}
19 R := Refine(R ∪ {(∃fv(PreU) \ (g ∪ {a, b}) · PreU , PostU)})
20 end foreach
21 end foreach
22 return R
end Algorithm
Fig. 5. The algorithm for sequential unknown calls.
it invokes conform to the specifications discovered by the verification algorithm. Therefore, the
correctness of the program depends on a (possible) further verification for the unknown procedures.
The soundness of our verification algorithm is guaranteed at line 20 in the algorithm Verify. Upon
return, the algorithm conducts another forward verification on the whole program, assuming that the
unknown procedures are already verified against the specifications discovered. As in Calcagno et al.
(2009), this final check rules out any potentially unsound precondition/postcondition pairs (due to
the use of abstraction); therefore, it ensures the soundness of our verification.
The termination of our verification algorithms is based on two facts: the finiteness of the
verification input (the program and its specifications), and the termination of our semantics. Firstly,
all the loops and (recursive) algorithm invocations in the three verification algorithms are performed
over the input program and specifications to be verified, where each time of iteration deals with
part of the specifications/states and each invocation processes part of the input program structurally.
Therefore, as long as all such processing terminates, the whole verification will terminate. This fact is
further guaranteed with the termination of our abstract semantics, which can be proved by claiming
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Table 1
Experimental results for simple list processing programs.
Program Time(s) Program specification Discovered unknown specification
findLast
(x; z) 0.00135
Pre := ls(x, null) ∧ x6=null
Post := ls(x, z) ∗ z 7→null
Pre := ∃w · a7→w ∗ ls(w, null)∧
a6=null ∧ w 6=null
Post := ls(a, b)∗ls(b, null)∧b6=null
append
(y; x) 0.00216
Pre := ls(x, null)∗ls(y, null)
Post := ls(x, y) ∗ ls(y, null)
Pre := ls(a, null)
Post := ls(a, b) ∗ ls(b, null)
copy(x; y) 0.00204 Pre := ls(x, null)
Post := ls(x, null)∗ls(y, null)
Pre := ls(a, null)
Post := ls(a, null)
revCopy
(x; y) 0.00107
Pre := ls(x, null)
Post := ls(x,null)∗ls(y,old(y))
Pre := true
Post := true
clear(; x) 0.00239 Pre := ls(x, null)
Post := emp ∧ x=null
Pre := a7→b ∗ ls(b, null)
Post := ls(b, null)
appendThree
(y, z; x) 0.00315
Pre := ls(x, null)∗ls(y, null)∗
ls(z, null)
Post := ls(x, null)
Pre := ls(a, null) ∗ ls(b, null)
Post := ls(a, null)
towardsLast
(x; y) 0.00428
Pre := ls(x, null) ∧ x6=null
Post := ls(x, y) ∗ ls(y, null)∧
x6=null
Pre := ls(a, null) ∧ a6=null
Post := ls(a, null) ∗ ls(b, null)∧
a6=null ∧ b6=null
iWillFail
(x, y; ) 0.00066
Pre := ls(x, null)
Post := ls(x, null) ∗ ls(y, null) (fail, ls(y, null))
the finiteness of program and logical variables, and hence the finiteness of all possible abstract
states (Distefano et al., 2006). Hence we can conclude that our verification algorithm terminates
with results of either fail or successfully returned specifications that the unknown procedures must
conform to.
7. Experiments and evaluation
We have implemented the two abstract semantics and the verification algorithms with Objective
Caml and evaluated them over some list processing programs to test their viability and precision. The
results are in Table 1. The first and second columns denote the programs used for evaluation (Calcagno
et al., 2007; Craciun et al., 2009) and their time consumption, respectively. We manually hide
some code in the original programs as calls to unknown procedures, for which we try to discover
specifications during the verification process. The third column shows the partial specification for
each program that is provided as input to our algorithm. The last column exhibits the specifications
discovered for unknown procedures inside those programs. The programs are listed in Fig. 6.
Herewenote down twoobservations on the experimental results. The first is that the specifications
discovered for the unknown procedures are more general than we would have expected. Bear in
mind that we have replaced some code from those programs with unknown calls. We have compared
the inferred specifications for those unknown calls with the original code. The results show that the
specifications derived by our algorithm not only fully capture the behaviors of the replaced code, but
also suggest other possible implementations. A case in point is our motivating example findLast
given in Section 2, where the original code replaced by an unknown call is y:=x.nextwith the post-
state x7→y∗ls(y, null)∧y6=null. According to our result, the post-state can bemore general, namely,
ls(x, y) ∗ ls(y, null) ∧ y6=null. This suggests that as long as y is not null, the unknown call can
traverse any number of nodes towards the tail of the list.
The second observation concerns the last program listed in the table, a procedure called
iWillFail, whose code is given as follows:
void iWillFail(node x, node y; ) { unknown(x; ) }.
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findLast(x; ref z) {
node w := [x], y;
if w = null then z := x
else
unknown(x; y);
findLast(y; z)
fi
}
append (y; ref x) {
if x = null then x := y
else
unknown(x; w);
if w = null then [x] := y
else append(y; w)
fi
fi
}
copy(x; ref y) {
if x = null then y := null
else
w := [x];
copy (w; y);
unknown(; y);
fi
}
revCopy(x; ref y) {
if x = null then skip
else
unknown(; y);
w := [x];
revCopy (w; y)
fi
}
clear(; ref x) {
if x = null then skip
else
w := [x];
unknown(x, w; );
x := w;
clear(; x)
fi
}
appendThree(y, z; ref x) {
unknown(x, y; );
unknown(x, z; )
}
towardsLast(x; y) {
unknown(; x);
unknown(x; y)
}
iWillFail(x, y; ) {
unknown(x; )
}
Fig. 6. Code for experimental examples.
This program is expected to be verified against the specification (Pre = ls(x, null), Post =
ls(x, null)∗ls(y, null)). Our verification fails and returns an additional formula ls(y, null) fromour
abduction process. A further analysis reveals that the failure is actually due to the given specification
where the precondition Pre is too weak for the program to establish the postcondition Post: since
y is not reachable from the parameters of the unknown call, no implementation of the unknown
call can establish the postcondition Post involving y. The returned formula from our verification
can then be used to strengthen the given specification. In this case, if we add ls(y, null) into
Pre via a separation conjunction, the verification will succeed with the specification (Preu
= ls(x, null), Postu = ls(x, null)) discovered for the procedure unknown.
We have also conducted some experiments to test our approach’s performance and scalability. The
results are shown in Table 2.
These results were achieved with an Intel Core 2 Quad CPU 2.66 GHz with 8 Gb memory. The
verified programs are either source code from FreeRTOS (Barry, 2009) (list.c and tasks.c), or
someworking code created by the author (wd-stat.c, ctrins.c, kr-db.c, krbid.c, krpage.c,
kdbadapt.c and kdbview.c). All of these programs mainly deal with pointer-based linear data
structures, such as singly linked and/or doubly linked lists. For example, list.c provides functions
for initializing and modifying lists, while tasks.c calls the functions for manipulating several
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Table 2
Experimental results for performance.
Program Lines of code Time (s) Memory (Mb) Specs discovered
list.h list.c 474 0.2 14.54 4
tasks.h tasks.c 3150 11.2 17.972 4
wd-stat.h wd-stat.c
ctrins.h ctrins.c 1404 1.232 16.664 10
kr-db.h kr-db.c 1674 1.837 16.636 12
krbid.h krbid.c
krpage.h krpage.c 2873 6.44 16.676 11
kdbadapt.h kdbadapt.c
kdbview.h kdbview.c 3208 7.88 17.54 13
lists during runtime. The other programs, wd-stat.c, ctrins.c, kr-db.c, krbid.c, krpage.c,
kdbadapt.c and kdbview.c maintain some list-based vectors for runtime data storage, or
hashtables implemented with a series of linked lists. Meanwhile, these programs have many function
calls in them, like the invocation of library functions or calls of other functions in the project.
As for verification purposes, we provide each function to be verified with its specification and run
our algorithm over it. The unknown functions are manually assigned—such as library function calls
which mainly consist of memory allocation functions like malloc, and functions that reside in other
programs of the project. Sincewe only consider pointer safety of linked data structures at themoment,
we did some modification to the programs to revise the code not relevant to our verification (data
types int and char for instance), such that the programs can be successfully verified.
The experimental results suggest that our approach might be able to scale up as a verification
system for pointer safety, although we are trying to do more experiments, as well as optimize the
algorithm, to justify this. What is more, we have tested the top-down feature of our abductive-
based verification system in the experiments. For instance, the specifications gained for ‘‘unknown’’
functions being invoked intasks.c are coherentwith the ones for the corresponding callee functions
in list.c. The same situation also applies to other test cases. On the basis of such results, we will
investigate more in this direction to uncover the power of a top-down abductive-based system as a
viable alternative to the current bottom-up approaches (Calcagno et al., 2009; Gulavani et al., 2009).
8. Conclusion
It is a challenging problem to automatically verify (even pointer safety of) heap-manipulating
imperative programs with unknown procedure calls. We propose a novel approach to this problem,
which infers expected specifications for unknown procedures from their calling contexts during
the verification process. The program is proven correct subject to the condition that the invoked
unknown procedures meet the inferred specifications. We employ a forward shape analysis with
separation logic and an enhanced abductive reasoning mechanism to synthesize both preconditions
and postconditions of the unknown procedure. As a proof of concept, we have also implemented a
prototype system to test the viability of the proposed approach.
There are two possible future directions. One is to explore a more general solution for unknown
calls in sequence as discussed; e.g., it might be possible for us to invent some heuristics to
strengthen the postcondition for the first unknown call, so that the precondition of the second can
be strengthened accordingly, to achieve more reasonable specifications for both. Another direction is
to extend this method to an abstract domain combining separation and numerical information (Chin
et al., 2007), so that more general properties, such as memory safety and functional correctness, can
be specified and verified. We envisage that, with the combined domain, the abstract semantics and
analysis algorithms will remain conceivably the same, but the abduction will be redefined to discover
the anti-frames for the newly introduced numerical features.
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